Q1 24 results showed a stronger clean NII, PPP and RoTE (@ 17%) run rate for 2024 compared to the guidance announced three months ago (@ 14%). Reasons: lower time deposit mix, deposit beta, and lower CoR. But not lending, though, as the net change is still affected by repayments, which Piraeus claims are seasonal.
Conclusion. Unless there is a structural shift on deposit trends or asset quality, chances are we will be raising our 2024 numbers after next quarter’s results.

Kri-Kri reported FY EBIT -3% below our estimate and -6% below their own mid-point guidance. DPS at E0.35 from E0.20. Still, 2023 was a record P&L and cash flow year, with RoE @ 31% and FCFE yield @ 9%, partially on lower costs and stronger volume, but mainly thanks to higher prices.
Which management said will reduce this year (further, as yogurt prices were reduced by 5% in H2), resulting in a -300bps lower EBIT margin (at 15%) on +8%-11% higher sales (>E233m), despite lower raw material prices. More importantly, Kri-Kri plans to enter new countries and/or introduce new products in existing ones.

EYDAP reported FY 2023 results, above our estimates, for several reasons, some of which accounting in nature. The water utility remains a case study whereas a RAB model and higher tariffs remain the only catalyst for earnings (and dividends) to go sustainably higher. And for us to be able to put a target price on the equity.
Conclusion: In the meantime, we reiterate our DO NOT OWN IT (DOI) rating. Introducing a RAB model is as interesting as it is imperative. The lack of visibility remains on all fronts, namely tariffs, investment plan, capital structure and dividend policy.

This note was supposed to be about Q4/FY 2023 results released on Apr 9 (Q4 PPC defined recurring EBITDA came in +13% vs our estimate). Instead, it will be about us downgrading our rating to DO NOT OWN IT (DOI) on the back of the E2bn/2GW solar deal with Mytilineos.
Why the downgrade? Because the implied cost of this deal does not make sense; it is much higher than PPC’s own installations or projects under development; it is higher than any of the recent solar projects we have seen; PPC does not need it; and it does not maximize shareholder value.

Q4 EBITDA came in better than expected by +10% thanks to the higher gross margin in IKEA. DPS announced at E0.12/2.8% yield. Fourlis provided pro forma retail accounts deconsolidating Trade Estates (TE). This is the first step for us to understand the dynamics of the retail business.
Conclusion. The second one is deconsolidating TE and using the proceeds to reduce retail net debt and interest cost. The final step is to maintain high single digit sales growth in both IKEA and sports goods, including through new stores. Management guided