Now that all Greek banks have -finally- published their full IFRS notes (Eurobank being the last), we analyze the most interesting points out of 2022 performance: Balance sheet structure, NII breakdown, RoTE differences, Securities HtM & unrealized losses, Stage 1-3 movements & coverage, and P&L reporting peculiarities. Some things we find annoying. You can see these highlighted in blue.
In the spreadsheet attached, you can see our Sector Map (with Q4/FY 2022 P&L, Asset Quality, Capital, and Balance sheet items, side-by-side for all 4 systemic banks); Balance sheet structure 2012-2022; Forecast earnings 2023-2025; Multiples; MREL; NII B/D; Stage 1-3; IRBB.

What’s new? With this note, we are making a case in favor of Greek banks, considering recent banking developments in the US and Europe, namely the collapse of SVB and Signature Bank, the rescue of First Republic Bank, and the acquisition of Credit Suisse by UBS, including the wipe out of AT1 holders. We reiterate our OWN IT ratings on NBG, Eurobank and Piraeus Bank.
We should also flag Bank of Cyprus, which can now boast about its huge cash balance of 30% to total assets (earning 3% yield @ ECB’s DFR) and low unrealized losses in its HtM securities portfolio.

What’s new? As more and more Investors are asking about the work done so far by loan servicers on Greek NPEs, managed either on behalf of the banks or on behalf of third parties, we are compiling all available performance data in this note. The numbers available are not always straightforward or sequentially comparable. The primary source is Bank of Greece.
Although the bulk of NPEs do not belong to banks anymore, the issue remains important because a) banks have kept senior notes from NPEs securitized on their balance sheets; b) the sovereign and its debt are on the hook for those senior notes because they are guaranteed by the state under the ‘Hercules’ scheme; c) cured NPEs could find their way back to banks’ balance sheets (if regulators/authorities approve) and from there to cash NII.
Market Snapshot & Conclusions. Our main findings are outlined below…

What’s new? Q3 was the first quarter out of many with strong underlying growth in NII (+9% qoq); combined with solid lending growth (Stage 1 up +E3bn following +E5bn in Q2) and contained costs (-2% qoq), it explains why all 4 systemic banks raised their FY 2022 guidance. The weird part is that none of them feels comfortable enough to share any sort of guidance for 2023. Which is even weirder considering they have not witnessed any deterioration in asset quality so far, thus maintaining their previous 2022 CoR estimates and hinting towards flat CoR in 2023.
Conclusion. Excluding Alpha, banking stocks have re-rated after Q2 results and are now trading 0.45x TBV 2023 on our estimates, with our TBV input essentially unchanged. Incorporating Q3 trends, we revised our models: we reiterate our OI in NBG, raising our PT to E5.5 (from E4.8) and upgrade Eurobank to OI with our PT at E1.5 (from E1.2). We see >40% valuation upside in both names which makes it worthy enough to own them, especially once adjusted for risk, thanks to their superior fully loaded CET1 and S3 coverage.

As expected, the ECB changed the TLTRO III terms to eliminate the carry trade and wipe out the excess liquidity from the market, in its fight against inflation. It also lowered the interest rate paid on minimum reserves.
With Greek Banks holding E51bn of ECB funding, we estimate the impact to be a negative -15%/-21%/-214bps on their 2023 NII/PPP/RoTE – but is 100% muted by the equivalent positive impact from the interest to be earned on their E59bn deposits with the ECB. The only possible exception is Alpha Bank, which could be net negative.
The above is isolated to 2023 as most of their TLTRO matures in December. Still, it would not be a surprise to see early repayments, especially since the ECB added three additional such dates to the calendar. 10 TLTRO III auctions took place between Sep 2019 to Dec 2021, each with a maturity of three years. Greek Banks raised most of their TLTRO on ECB’s Dec 2020 auction.
What did the ECB decide? Recalibration of TLTRO terms and lower remuneration on minimum reserves…